The Mika Zibanejad conundrum
Zibanejad is good, the Rangers need great
As the New York Rangers sift through the debris of the 2022-2023 season, it’s important to understand what went wrong. In the immediate aftermath of New York’s first round exit, a sense of existential dread crept in. It felt like head coach Gerard Gallant would be scapegoated for a poorly constructed roster.
The now former bench boss certainly wasn’t going to lead the Rangers to a Stanley Cup. But, now three weeks into flapping in the wind with no replacement hired and linked to several less than inspiring candidates New York is missing the larger problem at hand.
The Rangers have a talented roster: multiple 90 point forwards, a Norris winning defenseman and a Vezina winning goaltender. That alone gives the team a talent advantage most nights when it steps on the ice. It was baked into Gallant’s style of play and the team’s underlying philosophy.
The Gallant iteration of the team was centered around low event hockey, forcing teams to the outside, limiting quality chances and striking back quickly on the counter attack. The idea being that if there are only a handful of good scoring chances in a game, the Rangers’ high-end players would be able to convert more than the other team.
It’s the same idea as playing a ball control style against a high powered offense in the NFL. When teams decrease the total number of possessions within a game, it increases the overall variance. The hope is a single play can prevent Patrick Mahomes from snatching a soul.
The limiting total opportunities within a game is a viable path when a team features elite talent. The Rangers certainly feature high-end players capable of putting up gaudy counting stats. The trouble creeps in when New York’s best are pitted against comparable or better stars.
There’s no better manifestation of this problem than center Mika Zibanejad. This isn’t a knock on the Swede either, he’s put together quite a tenure in New York. To post 455 points in 486 games for an organization that regularly had a season leader in points below 60 for most of the last decade is impressive.
But, for two straight postseasons, against comparable talents, Zibanejad hasn’t reached that higher level the team’s success is predicated on. If there are only a handful of good opportunities by design, to not generate or finish them is a fundamental flaw.
This is where underlying statistics become invaluable in player evaluation. Going under the hood of Zibanejad’s underlying production paints a picture of a player who’s extremely choosy in his shot selection and is overly reliant on his shooting talent to finish lower quality scoring chances.
In the playoffs where the average quality of competition is better and teams are more reticent to take chances defensively, this means Zibanejad has even less room to work with than usual. That’s why the Rangers felt so hopeless at points against the Devils, relying on shooting talent renders a team at the whim of luck. Sometimes, the puck just doesn’t wanna go in.
The shot map above from the first round series against the Devils shows where Zibanejad’s shots came from. To have ten unblocked shots over a 7 game series and a single goal at five on five speaks to a lack of volume and a lack of a willingness to get to the high danger areas on the ice.
Those scoring chances from the slot and circles are less dangerous, they’re less likely to go in. This isn’t a new development or particularly surprising, this is who Zibanejad’s is.
The Rate Stats
The Rangers have felt the holes in their roster construction at the most inopportune times. Of course, the playoffs have a funny way of exposing them quickly as possible and teams that don’t adapt sink faster than Nikki Haley’s presidential aspirations.
This isn’t a knock on Zibanejad as a player. He’s quite talented and the Rangers heavily feature him. The last time the Swede didn’t lead the team in ice time was 2017-2018 when he finished second. But, New York claims to have Stanley Cup aspirations which requires comparison to the other contenders.
The bar graph above compares the first line centers of all 16 playoff teams and the rate the team produces scoring chances per 60 as well as scoring chances against per 60. A scoring chance is defined as a goal, shot on goal, missed shot or blocked shot.
Using rate stats or /60 allows for comparison of rates for players who have differing amounts of ice time. Having the common denominator allows for a more descriptive comparison. Of course, it can be slightly misleading for players who are further down the lineup and don’t garner significant ice time.
However, of these 16 centers, 15 cleared the 800 5 on 5 minute threshold and the 16th, Ryan Hartman checked in at 794. So, there’s no one sneaking in here because of a lighter workload.
Theoretically, if a team is consistently creating more total chances than the opposition, over the course of an extended period of time said team is more likely to score. This ignores the quality of said scoring chances, but that’s the next part of this comparison.
In comparison to every other first line center that qualified for the postseason, when Zibanejad was on the ice, his team produced the fewest scoring chances per 60 and surrendered the sixth most against. This speaks to the choosiness of Zibanejad’s line.
The natural rebuttal to this that the team gives is that it’s okay because it prioritizes high quality scoring opportunities. This point is rooted in focusing on the quality of a chance as opposed to the amount of chances.
If a team funnel pucks on net from every angle similarly to the Carolina Hurricanes or Seattle Kraken, they’re going to have good scoring chance generation but won’t have particularly dangerous scoring opportunities.
Playing with a volume of chances style emphasizes maintaining offensive zone pressure and wearing down the other team. On the other hand, being selective and prioritizing the quality of opportunity will mean a lower total of scoring chances but should lead to more dangerous scoring chances.
Expected goals is a measure of a scoring chance’s quality. Every single scoring chance is scored on a scale of 0.0-1.0, the more likely a chance is to result in a goal, the higher the expected goals value. The value is derived from historical data, meaning where goals came from in the past.
So, of the 16 first line centers in the playoffs, Zibanejad has the second lowest expected goals per 60 and the fourth highest expected goals against. If the prevailing sentiment about Zibanejad were true, that he and his line mates were more selective to create more dangerous opportunities, the relationship between scoring chances and expected goals would look closer to Jack Eichel of the Vegas Golden Knights.
While Eichel is on the ice for more scoring chances against, he still generates more dangerous ones which gives him a positive expected goals ratio. Zibanejad on the other hand is both out chanced in quantity and quality of chances against.
This combination of fewer total and dangerous chances makes Zibanejad and his line overly reliant on finishing talent. Conceptually, it makes sense, high end players can convert less dangerous scoring chances. That’s what sets them apart from the average player, their ability to make plays the others can’t.
The scatter plot above shows the on ice shooting percentage of the 16 first line centers of the 2023 playoffs. On ice shooting percentage combines the shooting percentage of everyone on the ice with a player, not just the individual. The advantage of using this more detailed statistic is it presents a more complete understanding of a player’s impact on the ice.
So, not only is Zibanejad a choosy shooter who doesn’t generate particularly dangerous chances, he and his line mates also don’t finish the chances they are so picky about creating. This is in part why it feels so difficult for the Rangers in stretches to find goals when they aren’t drawing penalties.
At five on five, where the bulk of the game is played, the team’s most used forward doesn’t create enough total or dangerous chances in comparison to his contemporaries. That makes the few they do create all the more precious. This also bears out the perception that Zibanejad’s line over-passes and looks for a perfect play.
Since Zibanejad and company don’t put the puck on the net often in comparison to their contemporaries, it puts a microscope on the chances they do create. If the Rangers are holding true to their team philosophy and trying to swing the game on a handful of plays, that’s where the game is decided.
The heat maps above from HockeyViz.Com visualize the selectiveness and where chances are coming from. The top left shows five on five expected goals creation, where Zibanejad grades out slightly below average. Areas where chances come from an above average rate are in red, below average rate in blue.
The darker the color, the more shots from the area. So, offensively, Zibanejad and his line mates are creating chances at an above average rate from the top of the right circle and the left half wall.
The other peril of this shooting philosophy is that these low danger chances are easier for the other team to recover the puck and get to offense quickly. So, not only are the Rangers not getting a ton of quantity or quality, they’re also not getting offensive zone time to alleviate pressure on the defense.
The Big Picture
The Rangers are better off with Zibanejad than not. The center was one of 19 players in the entire NHL to break the 90 point threshold this past season. More notably, Zibanejad’s contract and the protections included make moving him a non-starter for either party.
The time to discuss Zibanejad’s long-term role in the organization was prior to signing his current contract. At the time, I wrote that Zibanejad was a good player but not someone that could be counted to drive the first line of a Stanley Cup winning team. The forward’s shortcomings at five on five would simply be too much to overcome no matter how many power play points he accumulated.
At this point, Zibanejad is 30-years-old and not changing his game. The Rangers, through their cap commitments, have told the rest of the league what they prioritize and value. The organization trusts its goaltender to carry them at five on five and then win the game on the man advantage with its handful of high-end players.
The issue with said formula that’s repeatedly crept up in the postseason is that when New York doesn’t score on the power play, it doesn’t score at all. The Rangers have 10 losses in the postseason over the last two years in games where they didn’t score on the power play. All four losses against the Devils were games where the team didn’t convert on the man advantage.
For the organization to construct the roster, then double down with the additions of Patrick Kane and Vladimir Tarasenko was wholly intentional. The front office felt doing everything it could to swing the game state that’s not five on five was the key to a deep playoff run.
Whether it’s short sightedness or over confidence, the front office miscalculated somewhere in that plan. Banking on the team’s best players to carry the bulk of the load makes sense, the best players elevate their games in the postseason and is consistently a trend line for eventual Stanley Cup winning teams.
The issue for the Rangers is the limitations of their best players. That’s not to say Zibanejad, Kreider, Panarin and Trocheck aren’t good players. Their collective counting stats and track records prove their worth. It’s just that in comparison to the other teams they come across, they haven’t been enough.
Just for argument’s sake, the best forwards standing in the Stanley Cup final: Matthew Tkachuk, Alexander Barkov, Jack Eichel and Mark Stone are all better players than any forward on the Rangers. You wanna argue Stone isn’t, fine, but he’s risen to the moment this postseason in a way no Ranger did or could.
That’s the crux of the Rangers’ problem going forward. As their best four forwards enter their early 30s with no additional elite talent on the way, the Rangers are boxed in. Good enough to consistently make the playoffs, but no real path to winning a Stanley Cup barring something unexpected.
For too long the Rangers mantra of ride the best goalie in the world as far as you can is a fool’s errand in today’s NHL. Scoring is going up three years in a row. Power play opportunities are up four seasons in a row. If a team isn’t scoring four or five goals a game, the margin for error is microscopic.
Ultimately, that’s the biggest flaw with the Rangers’ roster construction. It can only win a game one type of way. Being so reliant on the power play to score against quality opposition means that when it doesn’t they’re hopeless at five on five.
Goaltender Igor Shesterkin will do his damndest to keep the other team at bay, but he can’t score too. Trying to win hockey games 2-1 and 3-2 is particularly challenging in today’s offense centric league.
It’s not impossible, but it’s more difficult. That’s the major take away from the playoff series against the Devils, the Rangers were overly reliant on a handful of players to win games in a very specific way. When those few players wilted, the Devils bent the Rangers to their whim.
New York, much like its high end forwards is pretty good. Unfortunately for the Rangers, the bar for winning a Stanley Cup is greatness. Some really talented groups never manage to bridge the gap between good and great. There’s nothing wrong with being a good team that consistently makes the playoffs, gets everyone paid and has a jersey or two retired.
But, this game is about winning the Stanley Cup. Entering that rarified strata makes you eternally untouchable. The Rangers as an organization think they’re close, it’s on Zibanejad to find that next level in his game and make that tangible, not wishful thinking.